Abstract
Civil wars contain a set of actors that have the ability to block settlement and continue the war on their own. When they contain more “veto players,” conflicts are much longer and negotiations are more likely to break down. The rate of success of international efforts to resolve multi-party civil wars is much lower than when there is only one rebel group fighting the government. This article discusses implications for peacemakers designing responses to conflicts with multiple veto players. Negotiations in these conflicts are most likely to lead to a peace agreement that successfully ends the war if they include all veto players and exclude non-veto players.
Recommended Citation
2 Penn St. J.L. & Int'l Aff. 38 (2013).
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