Part II of this paper provides an overview of the U.N. Charter's framework for collective security, with a particular focus on the Charter's provision for the. creation, command, and control of U.N. military forces. During the Cold War, this framework fell into desuetude, and U.N. forces that participated in enforcement actions, such as Korea and Iraq, as well as peacekeeping operations, were created in ad hoc fashion outside the Charter's framework. Part III examines this development and considers how the conclusion of an Article 43 agreement might alter the President's authority under international law to pursue U.S. interests while participating in a U.N. operation.
International law is but one source of possible limitation on the President's authority to commit U.S. forces. Congress plays a central role as well. Part IV considers how the conclusion of an Article 43 agreement might alter the existing war powers balance between the President and Congress. Part V evaluates Article 43's future in light of the international and domestic legal consequences associated with the conclusion of an Article 43 agreement.
James W. Houck, The Commander in Chief and United Nations Charter Article 43: A Case of Irreconcilable Differences?, 12 Dick. J. Int'l L. 1 (1993).