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Birger Heldt
Folke Bernadotte Academy

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THE LACK OF COORDINATION IN DIPLOMATIC PEACEMAKING

Birger Heldt

As often observed in recent studies on peacemaking, there has been a shift from a few high-profile mediators to the present situation, characterized by states, ad-hoc groups of states and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) (Track I diplomacy) as well as non-governmental organizations (NGOs), local organizations and prominent figures (Track II diplomacy). The origin of this shift may be traced back to the early 1990s when the United Nations initiated efforts to increase and coordinate the contributions of regional arrangements for addressing threats to international peace and security. One alleged impetus for the change was the United

* Birger Heldt, Director of Research, Folke Bernadotte Academy, Sweden.

Nation’s perceived inability to cope with the demand for peacekeeping and peacemaking in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War.\(^2\) The increase in peacemaking actors may also be a consequence of the expanded space for third-party initiatives as Cold War rivalries ended. Regardless of the cause, this development conforms with Article 52 of the U.N. Charter, which encourages peace initiatives from regional actors as the first resort before cases are referred to the U.N., which should be the last resort.\(^3\)

The increased number of peacemaking actors coincides with “a five-fold increase in the number of diplomatic interventions” in conflicts (both protracted and emerging) in the 1990s, as compared to the 1980s.\(^4\) Similarly, the number of U.N. peacemaking initiatives increased by approximately forty percent during 2000-2003 as compared with the 1990s, and fivefold between 1989 and 2002.\(^5\) Furthermore, peacemaking initiatives of so-called Groups of Friends (small ad-hoc groupings of states and IGOs) increased seven-fold between 1991 and 2006.\(^6\) Moreover, between 1993 and 2004, there were 550 third-party peacemaking initiatives (mediation, third-party-moderated direct talks, and good offices) in emerging conflicts alone.\(^7\)

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\(^2\) See Prantl, supra note 1, at 561.

\(^3\) U.N. Charter art. 52, para. 2 (“[M]ake every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council.”), http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter8.shtml.


\(^5\) Id. at 67.

\(^6\) Id.

\(^7\) FRIDA MÖLLER, CODEBOOK FOR THE DATASET MANAGING INTRASTATE LOW-LEVEL CONFLICT (MILC) (2007) (for data and detailed dataset
The increased amount of peacemaking, however, is accompanied by a low success rate. On average, there were 31 peacemaking attempts for every agreement in emerging civil conflicts from 1993 to 2004, and only fifteen percent of these conflicts ended through an agreement (as compared to the other outcomes of victory, low activity or escalation to war).  

This article focuses on recent emerging conflicts, and assesses whether peacemaking has been characterized by coordination. The second section examines empirical patterns and their consequences. The third section is an attempt to formulate policy implications that touch upon the role of regional organisations, a pre-determined division of labour, and the importance of having a long-term peacemaking strategy. The focus of this analysis should not diminish efforts to deal with another problem: the general inaction on the part of the international community in responding to the large majority of emerging conflicts may be a bigger problem than the over-attention suffered by a few cases.

**MUCH PEACEMAKING, BUT LITTLE COORDINATION**

Peacemaking is prevalent, but is often not coordinated with regard to choice of tools (mediation, etc.), the agenda or the issues of the talks. This lack of coordination has for many years been recognized as detrimental. It allows conflict parties to “shop around,” wait for better deals, play the third parties against one another in search of a better deal, or sabotage peacemaking attempts.  

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8 Heldt, supra note 7.  
9 As used here “emerging” is defined as a conflict that has resulted in at least 25—but less than 1,000—deaths per year.  
insight is corroborated by statistical findings that indicate a negative relationship between the number of involved third parties and the likelihood of reaching a negotiated agreement in terms of ceasefires, partial or full peace agreements that halt the violence.\(^{11}\) A study of the size of Group of Friends mechanisms—most of which were applied on protracted instead of emerging conflicts—makes a similar observation: the larger the size of a Group of Friends, the less consistent the action.\(^{12}\) Coordination is thus very difficult, even when coordination mechanisms are in place.

One example, among the worst cases in this regard, is the conflict between Bosnia and Herzegovina and the insurgent Croat Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. From October to December of 1993 a plethora of Track I and Track II actors attempted to resolve the conflict. Mediation (M), third-party moderated direct talks (D) and good offices (G) were initiated in the following sequence: D, D, G, D, G, D, M, D, G, D, G, G, M, D, G, G, M, G, G, M.”\(^{13}\) Equally disorderly was the sequence of issues discussed, in terms of how the talks moved back and forth between basic incompatibility (government power or independence/autonomy), behavior (ceasefires, withdrawal of troops, etc.), and other issues (refugees, talks about talks, etc.).\(^{14}\)

It is in this particular case difficult to discern a strategy or straight trajectory; rather it appears that everything is tried and retried at some point. For instance, it may make sense to start off with

\(^{11}\) Böhmelt, supra note 10; Heldt, supra note 10; David Cunningham, *Veto Players and Civil War Duration*, 50 AM. J. POL. SCI. 875, 877, 879 (2006).


\(^{13}\) See Heldt, supra note 7, at 6.

\(^{14}\) According to a private conversation with a high-level diplomat who was involved in Balkans peacemaking, this lack of coordination or even competition was a huge problem for peacemaking in the Balkans. There is a large debate as to the merits of sequencing peacemaking tools and negotiation issues: how sequencing should be carried out, what tools to use, what issues to deal with and in what order. See Heldt, supra note 7 (providing a brief literature overview).
“other issues,” and over time move towards the more difficult or core matters instead of moving back and forth again and again.\textsuperscript{15} This disorder and plethora of peacemaking attempts makes it difficult to understand how one peacemaking attempt can build on previous attempts, or even how the conflict actors themselves can keep up with the process. This is especially because peacemaking attempts have different start dates, and sometimes overlap. It is not implausible that this peacemaking pattern prolonged the conflict, which in the end was solved on the battlefield instead of through negotiations.

Other extreme cases for the period of 1993-2004 involving many third-parties and different mediation tools include: Burundi (late 1997-2003), Croatia (1995), Guinea Bissau (1998), Israel/Palestine (2000-2002), and the Ivory Coast (2002-2003).\textsuperscript{16} It is possible to find examples of peacemaking, where the application of third-party tools and issues does not appear chaotic or inconsistent, even though there are many peacemaking attempts; however, such cases are rare.

An inherent feature of such uncoordinated peacemaking processes is not simply a lack of institutional memory and consistency, but also an absence of learning. Third-party initiated peacemaking should, in theory, move the process forward by softening the parties, increasing mutual trust and negotiating skills, and providing information on fundamental issues that make parties more likely to spot zones of agreements.\textsuperscript{17} Third parties also stand to learn from the process. However, since third parties change and are numerous in some cases, learning does not appear feasible: third parties usually do not engage for an extended period of time, and their lessons learned are not transferred to succeeding or competing third parties through debriefings. This may partly explain the lack of

\textsuperscript{15} Id.

\textsuperscript{16} Heldt, supra note 7, at 7.

peacemaking consistency and continuity in some cases, and the general lack of progress. It also illustrates how potentially damaging the lack of long-term engagement by lead peacemakers can be in individual cases.

**Towards More Coordination, and More Peacemaking**

Just as scholars and practitioners think in terms of the steps to war, it may be useful to apply a similar concept and think in terms of steps to peace. Steps to peace “implies that early efforts may, or perhaps even should, fail to generate a breakthrough, but they will [ideally] inch the process forward, in a productive way such that the next mediation attempt can build upon” earlier efforts. It implies also that quick breakthroughs—or rapid progress—will be the exception rather than the rule, and thus will be time-consuming. Meanwhile, during the period 1993-2004, about one third of the emerging conflicts escalated to war, and all but five of the cases escalating did so within two calendar years. The same data also shows that if a conflict avoids escalation in the immediate term, it is unlikely it will escalate in the future. This pattern may be due to the most war-prone cases escalating right away, thereby leaving the less war-prone cases behind; or that peacemaking efforts start to bite—or are perhaps usually only initiated—after some period of time. However, since low-level conflicts that escalate to war almost always do so within a 24-month period, time is of the essence. There is no time for many cumulative peacemaking attempts or steps to peace, not least since peacemaking attempts require time-consuming preparations. Coordination must ideally be at hand from the very beginning.

Strategic coordination tools such as ad hoc Groups of Friends, contact groups, friends of a country, and implementation

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group approaches, have different strengths and weaknesses.\textsuperscript{20} They emerged as novel strategic level peacemaking coordination mechanisms in the early 1990s and are now widely used with the goal of achieving strategic level coherence and coordination of peacemaking in protracted armed conflicts. The focus in this article is, however, on emerging cases, where coordination mechanisms such as Groups of Friends are rarely used, probably because emerging intrastate conflicts do not elicit much international interest. It may therefore be necessary to consider other solutions which involve a system or template for coordination that will not only work from the very first day of an emerging conflict, but also makes peacemaking more prevalent.

One policy implication is that policymakers need to have a long-term strategy to address the coordination problem, part of which is to limit the number of peacemakers in a given conflict. A second policy implication is not to let initial failures (or non-successes) discourage further peacemaking. Policymakers need to have a long-term view of the process, and carry out the process in a strategic manner. To paraphrase Sheri Rosenberg,\textsuperscript{21} peacemaking is a process, not an event. Unsuccessful initial mediations build a foundation for subsequent peacemaking attempts. Research suggests that it is not sufficient to simply do the right thing; it has to be done in a certain order, and repeatedly. One far-reaching vision involves not only the creation of a predetermined division of labor, but preferably also a predetermined third party that (with the support of the international community) takes the overall responsibility for an individual emerging conflict. The U.N. and some IGOs appear to be the only viable and legitimate actors to assume such regional or sub-regional responsibilities. Admittedly, such ideal planning would in practice be difficult to achieve in some regions and sub-regions of the world (especially in Africa and Asia) because of (sub-) regional rivalries and unresolved disputes, and because of vested interests in

\textsuperscript{20} See generally Prantl, supra note 1; TERESA WHITFIELD, EXTERNAL ACTORS IN MEDIATION: DILEMMAS & OPTIONS FOR MEDIATORS 18 (2010); WHITFIELD, supra note 12; Whitfield, supra note 10, at 20-21; TERESA WHITFIELD, WORKING WITH GROUPS OF FRIENDS (2010).

\textsuperscript{21} Sheri R. Rosenberg, Genocide is a Process, Not an Event, 7 GENOCIDE STUD. & PREVENTION 16 (2012).
the conflicts among some countries. Moreover, this approach would invalidate anything but so-called Track 1 diplomacy, which involves official government figures, and thus involves a return to the pattern of the centralised peacemaking that existed before the 1990s. At the same time this approach would increase the number of overall peacemaking attempts. In short, the approach involves fewer but more coordinated actors, not less peacemaking. The present pattern of peacemaking does not appear to be productive; a change is necessary.

The international community, under the leadership of the U.N., has achieved a high degree of coordination in the areas of peacekeeping and peacebuilding, so there may already be templates for how to improve coordination in the area of peacemaking. However, peacekeeping is easier to coordinate. Given the high costs and manpower required, there are fewer potential peacekeeping actors. There is moreover no competition or out-bidding among these potential actors, and in those cases where several actors carry out peacekeeping simultaneously (e.g., Kosovo), there is close coordination and a clear division of labor. Peacemaking is the exact opposite of this scenario and a need exists to develop new methods to deal with this issue.

A further policy implication is that efforts to improve coordination should not crowd out the fact that most emerging conflicts are left totally or partially “orphaned,” in that there are no or few outside peacemaking attempts. Only a handful of cases suffer from over-attention. Efforts to improve coordination should thus not lose sight of the need for more peacemaking, which in fact may be a bigger problem than the lack of coordination in a few select cases.

On a final policy note, regardless of which is the most pressing issue, they all may be closely linked, in that closer attention to coordination issues may serve to strengthen the culture of prevention and peacemaking. A synergy effect may thus be at hand.

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22 Fen O. Hampson, Preventive Diplomacy at the United Nations and Beyond, in FROM REACTION TO CONFLICT PREVENTION: OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE UN SYSTEM 139, 148-152 (Fen O. Hampson & David Malone eds., 1996).