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Remarks, The Big Picture: Beyond Hot Spots & Crises in Our Interconnected World

Anne-Marie Slaughter

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REMARKS, THE BIG PICTURE: BEYOND HOT SPOTS & CRISES IN OUR INTERCONNECTED WORLD*

Anne-Marie Slaughter**

INTRODUCTION

You will note that my self-introduction is a little different than the formal one provided a few moments ago by my former colleague, P.J. Crowley. I introduce myself as a foreign policy curator @SlaughterAM. @SlaughterAM is my Twitter handle, and every day I spend somewhere between 15 minutes to one hour looking through articles, links, blog posts, things written by P.J. Crowley,¹ and other things that come across my Twitter feed from about 1,500 people around the world. And I spend time figuring out which ones I think are important and then I send them out to 25,000 people around the world. It is a way of being connected in real-time—a way that I could not have imagined when I wrote the article² that was referenced in the introduction. These real-time connections offer insights into how

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* This essay was adapted from the transcribed remarks of Anne-Marie Slaughter delivered on March 15, 2012 at the Penn State Dickinson School of Law and School of International Affairs as part of a lecture series on the evolving national security narrative.

** Bert G. Kerstetter ’66 University Professor of Politics and International Affairs, Princeton University. From 2009–2011, she served as Director of Policy Planning for the United States Department of State.


the United States is and should be conducting foreign policy today. I hope by the end of my presentation, you will have a better understanding of why I choose to identify myself as a foreign policy curator.

The title of my presentation references hot spots and crises, so let’s start with a few of them. At the outset, of course, note that it is an election year, which is not a crisis or hot spot—but is nevertheless relevant because it is an election that that could be decided by foreign policy, as Paul Begala recently wrote. Between now and November, a number of things could happen: in Afghanistan; between Iran and Israel; fluctuations in the price of oil; and, as always, a possible terrorist attack.

So here are some of the foreign policy crises of the day. First is Iran. Following closely behind is Egypt. Let’s take a moment to recall the images from Tahrir Square a little over one year ago. It is extraordinary to note how momentous this occasion was in human history, and also to realize how much the power structure has changed in Egypt and yet how much is still entrenched. Afghanistan will continue to occupy significant U.S. foreign policy attention; we are likely to revisit our exit strategy there over the course of the coming year. Other crises include famine in Somalia and instability in the South China Sea. As many in the audience know, the South China Sea has been an important focus of U.S. diplomacy in an effort to avoid a military confrontation that could escalate into a larger conflict. It is a crisis that can flare at any minute. And finally, the crisis in Syria. Of course, this list does not include many other issues on the foreign policy agenda. However, it demonstrates the very full plate before the Obama Administration—possibly, the fullest plate of any administration in my lifetime.

Having highlighted several of the crises currently in the headlines, my hope today is to take you behind the headlines and to show you the world as I see it—as a strategic thinker, as a member of

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the academic community, and with the benefit of two years in Washington that I have now had a chance to put in broader perspective.

I. WORLD REBALANCING I – THE BILLIARD BALL WORLD

I came of age as a foreign policy student, and then professor, in a bipolar world, a frozen conflict between two superpowers. Then in the 1990s, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the world became unipolar. Indeed, the French foreign minister called the United States a “hyper-power,” as if we bestrode the world like a colossus; when we snapped our fingers, other states did what we asked. This may be a stylized view of the 1990s, and it is not the way I remember the period, but certainly in comparison to the 1980s and where we are now, it is a fair representation.

Today, we live in a much more multipolar world. The United States remains the single most powerful nation in the world, and I think it is going to stay that way for the foreseeable future. Yet many other nations are powerful as well: traditional powers such as the members of the European Union, Japan, and Russia; rising powers like China, India, Brazil and South Africa; and middle powers like Turkey and Indonesia. It is important to note that the E.U. is the largest economy in the world, according to no less an authority than the C.I.A. Factbook. It lists the E.U. as the world’s largest economy, followed by the United States and China—an order not often noted in the press.

The balance of power in the world of states has thus shifted several times over the past six decades. This is the billiard ball world. It is the world where if I were teaching at the United States Army War College most people assume we live in. In this world—the world I grew up in—states were like billiard balls. We tried to prevent them from crashing into each other. We did not, however, look inside them. We did not think we could change what happened inside them,

and we did not care what happened inside them. Rather the focus in
the billiard ball world was on how the states were configured relative
to each other. This was the world of the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Last year, I taught a national security seminar at the
Woodrow Wilson School. My students’ thesis papers were due on
April 2, and we had class on April 3. Now I remember my own
undergraduate days enough to know you do not assign homework
the night that the students have to hand in their thesis papers. So
instead I told my students: “I’m going to show a movie and you have
to stay awake. That is your job for this class.” So I chose Thirteen
Days⁶ and it did keep them awake. It will keep you awake. If you
have not seen it, it is a pretty good representation of the thirteen days
of the Cuban Missile Crisis. It is focused entirely on the president
and the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (or
EXCOMM), and it does a powerful job of convincing you that the
world was on the brink of nuclear war.

At the end of class, I asked my students what was the biggest
difference between the world of the Cuban Missile Crisis and the
world that I was teaching about today? What was the biggest
difference other than the fact that everyone smoked and drank pretty
much all the time? A couple of them raised their hands immediately
and said, “There were only two states in the world: the United States
and the Soviet Union.” In the movie, you will of course hear about
Cuba, but only as a Soviet client state. There is one mention of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and one mention of the
Organization of American States (OAS). Most strikingly, there is a
moment when National Security Advisor McGeorge “Mac”
Bundy comes to President Kennedy and says something to the effect of
“China invaded India today, but you really don’t want to hear about
that.”⁷ Take a moment to reflect on that statement and its
implications for how the world has changed. Imagine if China
invaded India today. Imagine what the headlines would look like and
what all of us would be deeply worried about. Of course, both are

⁷ See also Lt. James Barnard Calvin, The China – India Border War (1962) at
57-78 (MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE 1984),
nuclear states to begin with, but think about the implications for that region of the world. But it is true: China did invade India in October 1962 and it is barely a footnote. We were eyeball to eyeball in a deadly game of high-stakes poker with the Soviet Union, and as Secretary of State Dean Rusk is reputed to have said after the crisis was resolved: “the other guy blinked.”

II. WORLD REBALANCING II – THE RISE OF SOCIAL ACTORS

Now, I want to talk about the second rebalancing. The United Nations remains the exemplification of the billiard ball world: every foreign minister, every head of state shows up at the U.N. General Assembly (and snarls the traffic in New York City) to debate global issues. Cathy Ashton, the U.N. High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, describes the U.N. General Assembly meeting as “Speed Dating for Diplomats.” This description fits; effectively, the U.S. Secretary of State goes into one bilateral meeting with another foreign minister or head of state, the bell rings, she gets up, walks to the next room, has another bilateral, and then another. And every other foreign minister and head of state is doing the same.

Across town at exactly the same time is the Clinton Global Initiative. Many of the same people attend (thereby further snarling traffic as people try to get from the East Side to the West Side), and they discuss many of the same issues on the agenda at the U.N. General Assembly: health, water, food, corruption, security and terrorism, fragile states. The difference is that although many of the same heads of state attend—they come and they stand with former President Clinton on a platform—standing next to them is a CEO of a major corporation, the head of a major non-governmental organization, the head of a foundation, church leaders, and scholars from think tanks and universities. It is a constellation of social actors. I do not like calling them non-state actors because as Clay Shirky,

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who wrote *Here Comes Everybody*,\(^\text{10}\) once said, “Talking about non-state actors is like calling a car a horseless carriage.” We know what it isn’t but we don’t know what it is. These social actors represent the private economic sector as well as the civic sector. Thus the second rebalancing of power in the world over the past three or four decades has been a shift in power from governments to social actors.

A few examples may illustrate the power exercised by this growing cadre of social actors. The world has not been able to conclude many treaties in the past twenty years, but the two most significant examples—the treaty banning landmines\(^\text{11}\) and the treaty establishing the International Criminal Court\(^\text{12}\)—both were put in motion by coalitions of social actors. Indeed, I do not think we would have had either treaty if we did not have the social actors. In the case of the landmines treaty, a global network of actors in over ninety countries is doing all sorts of work to implement the treaty and address other issues related to landmines. A number of you may be thinking “Well, that’s great, but the largest military power in the world did not sign it.” And you are correct—the United States did not but we spent quite a bit of time in the Obama Administration talking about how we can conform our policies as closely as possible to the landmines treaty, and I predict the United States will sign it within the next decade or so.

So that is one example of the power of social actors. Another is cookstoves. I have to say this example is as far from the Cuban Missile Crisis world of the State Department as you can possibly get. And when I tell people that a fair amount of energy in the Clinton State Department was spent on cookstoves, they are surprised—to say the least. The mission of the Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves\(^\text{13}\) is to save lives, to improve livelihoods, to empower

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women and to combat climate change. Inefficient cookstoves, burning wood primarily (and also other kinds of fuel) are a major source of carbon emissions. They present huge health hazards. Hundreds of millions of people breathe horrible smoke in very small spaces. They also present major security hazards for women who have to gather the fuel, often quite far from their camps in conflict zones and fragile states, where women often are raped or murdered. If this problem can be addressed, it is a foreign policy trifecta. We worry about climate change. We worry about global health, which of course is a huge economic drag and a barrier to development. And we worry about empowering women as agents of development. The Alliance is tackling all three problems on a global scale: its goal is one hundred million homes adopting clean cookstoves by 2020. It is also designed to create a market for these cookstoves. Its goal is not to give away cookstoves, but to go into different communities and make and adopt whatever technology is locally available to make things that families, particularly women, can sell and use.

The Alliance started with 75 partners, now has 225 partners, and is growing fast. The initiative was created by the U.S. State Department, the Environmental Protection Agency, USAID, the Department of Health and Human Services and the Centers for Disease Control. If you know anything about bureaucratic politics, you know that getting those five agencies together is as hard as any international negotiation. But those five agencies came together, worked with their German counterparts, their Dutch counterparts, their Peruvian, and their Norwegian counterparts; also with Dow Corning, Shell, Morgan Stanley and a number of other corporations; and of course, with lots of NGOs. This is exactly the kind of networked problem-solving coalition that we are helping to orchestrate as U.S. diplomats, and that will have a major impact.

Now, let’s turn to a couple of examples of bottom-up initiatives. I have spent a lot of my time in the last year going to tech conferences with people who are much, much younger than I am. Their world is very much the world I am about to describe in terms of being empowered to accomplish things locally and then take them global. The first example is the contrast between USAID and
KIVA.\textsuperscript{14} USAID is the United States’ development agency, and it awards roughly fifteen billion dollars in foreign assistance every year.\textsuperscript{15} It has important missions all over the world, but increasingly, that kind of top-down official development assistance is being supplemented by projects like KIVA.

KIVA was founded by students who put together an online platform that allows anyone to look at development projects in any area—education, health, women. Once you find a project of interest, you can then donate funds directly to that project. You cut out the government assistance middleman. More than $300 million dollars have been donated by more than one million donors in about four years.\textsuperscript{16} Of course, $300 million dollars does not match the USAID budget, but this project is only getting started—and three or four other platforms provide similar opportunities for individuals to support development projects directly.

A second example of bottom-up initiatives is a technological shift in democracy and capacity building, and particularly, in monitoring elections. If you have been following the headlines, you know that the United States is in a dispute with Egypt over the arrest of young Americans who have been working on election monitoring.\textsuperscript{17} One of the Americans arrested is from the International Republican Institute, a congressionally-funded institution. Beyond these institutional relationships, nations around the world increasingly use a platform called Ushahidi.\textsuperscript{18} It was developed by four Kenyan computer technicians, or technologists, who, during the Kenyan elections in 2007, when there was so much

\textsuperscript{14} See generally KIVA, \url{http://www.kiva.org/start}.
\textsuperscript{15} Where Does USAID’s Money Go?, USAID, \url{http://transition.usaid.gov/policy/budget/money/}.
\textsuperscript{16} See Joanne Chen, From Private Pennies to Public Good, CONTEXTS: AM. SOC. ASS’N, Summer 2012, \url{http://contexts.org/articles/summer-2012/from-private-pennies-to-public-good/}.
\textsuperscript{17} See Leila Fadel, Sam LaHood, NGO Worker, Hid in U.S. Embassy in Cairo for Four Weeks Under ‘Real Fear of Arrest’, WASH. POST, Mar. 6, 2012, \url{http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/blogpost/post/sam-lahood-blames-mubarak-era-minister-with-agenda-of-her-own-for-raid/2012/03/06/gIQA9rwKuR_blog.html}.
\textsuperscript{18} See generally USHABIDI, \url{http://www.ushahidi.com/about}.
violence after the elections, got together and created software that would allow Kenyans to text from anywhere in the country where they saw violence and to map it very quickly. That application has now been used in over 7,000 locations around the world, and has launched a new profession called crisis mapping. Ushahidi has customized this technology for any number of purposes. After the Haitian earthquake, Jared Cohen, a member of the Policy Planning Staff at the State Department, reached out to the Ushahidi staff, and asked them to customize the technology to be used in Haiti so that Haitians could text a central number to tell where people were under rubble. They agreed, and it was done very fast, and it was very useful.

A final example of this sort of bottom-up initiative is the Israeli pull-out from Gaza. James Wolfensohn was appointed as the U.S. Special Envoy for Gaza Disengagement. His charge was to attract investment into Gaza and help facilitate the disengagement. Obviously, the disengagement process has been highly problematic, and I am not suggesting that any bottom-up or top-down initiative is going to fix the underlying problem. However, a recent initiative has been successful in spurring growth in the West Bank. The initiative was created by the Center for American Progress, with the collaboration of the insurance company AIG, the Middle Eastern Investment Initiative and the National Insurance Company, a Palestinian company. The purpose of the initiative is to provide basic political risk insurance for investments in the West Bank—investments for which USAID provides some funding, but only as a sponsor. The initiative was developed from the bottom-up and the government came in only to lend a helping hand.

III. POWER AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LEGO WORLD

If you take nothing else away from tonight, remember those billiard balls—and now, think about Lego sets. (You do have to love the internet. I was trying to develop a picture in my mind to help capture this idea of what the world has become. We have two sons, and have bought plenty of Lego over the years. We can build a house the size of our house out of the amount of Lego we have. So it occurs to me, the new world is Lego. And of course, I typed “Lego billiard balls” into Google and fifty images came up. I do not know
who is spending their time making billiard balls out of Lego but I am grateful.)

So here is the concept. We are in a world in which states come apart, which has been true certainly for fifteen years. I wrote my first book, *A New World Order*, published in 2004, about the way states were coming apart into their component parts.\(^\text{19}\) For example, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the U.S. Justice Department and the U.S. Treasury Department each have the ability to network with their counterparts in other countries. Today, they equally have the ability to network or partner or make an alliance with social actors. The governments can be taken apart, put together with corporations, foundations, NGOs, church groups, universities, or any number of social actors in any number of different coalitions. And the world that results is much more complicated—almost terrifyingly complex. But this is the world we live in today. The Obama Administration’s National Security Strategy mentions public-private partnerships over thirty times.\(^\text{20}\) Every other government I have spoken to about this is also looking at how to harness the power of the social sector.

So what I want to do next is talk about power and leadership in the Lego world. Before I do, I want to be very clear that I am not suggesting for a moment that the billiard ball world has gone away. I see Professor Flynt Leverett in the audience this evening, a scholar and expert on the Middle East and particularly Iran.\(^\text{21}\) Our relations with Iran look a whole lot more like the Cuban Missile Crisis view of the world than they do like the Lego world model. We have very little social contact with Iran or North Korea. Our relations with Cuba and Venezuela, or even in some dimensions, our relations with China, remain traditional, high security geopolitics: a world in which states are reduced to their head of state, their foreign ministry, and their

\(^\text{19}\) See generally Anne-Marie Slaughter, *A New World Order* (2004).


army, and they interact with other states almost entirely in terms of power. That world is with us, and I do not see it going away. It is alongside this new world, or more precisely, this new world is alongside it. Both exist. Both have to be addressed in terms of our policies going forward.

Let’s talk for a moment about power. In the billiard ball world, you can build big, enduring things—like the U.N., the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the World Health Organization (WHO). In the Lego world, you can build things that are vastly more flexible, more malleable, and that are constantly morphing. The Lego world offers infinite combinations. Power is the ability to get other people to do what you want. Traditionally, we think of power in terms of a hierarchy or a ladder, and the most powerful person is the person at the top of that ladder. The higher you climb, the more powerful you are. And one of the principal ways you exercise power is by command, as noted by Joseph S. Nye, Jr. in his most recent book, *The Future of Power*. This is a proposition I took much more seriously before I had teenage sons. Now, I often find command elicits exactly the opposite of what I want to happen. Nevertheless, in theory you can command. More subtly, you can control agendas and structure options. (In my house that means you can go to baseball camp or you can go to technology camp. The option of not going to camp is not on the table.) Any good bureaucrat knows how to give three options to her boss and have two be unthinkable and the one you want be the obvious choice. Even more subtly, you can structure preferences. (Again, in the family setting, we talk about what we do as a family. What is our moral code? What do we think the right thing to do is? It is a way to shape what others—maybe our children—think they want.) They are not aware that their preferences are being shaped. It is a very effective way of exercising power, and it is the way the United States exercises soft power.

So that’s power in the billiard ball world. It still exists in the Lego world, but in much smaller proportion. The Lego world is a networked world. It is a horizontal world. There are no ladders

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because there are no hierarchies. It is a web. Power still exists in a web, but it is exercised from the center, not the top.

The best illustration of this theory may be an examination of how we determined that Mohamed Atta was the lead terrorist after 9/11? We figured it out because he was the only one who had links to all the others. In Lego world, the person who is the most connected is the person who can mobilize everybody else, who knows the most, who has the greatest ability to mobilize others. This kind of power is exercised quite differently. You cannot command because you have no coercive ability. You cannot command, so instead you mobilize. What you do is you reach out to your contacts. You let them know what is happening. You get them to reach out to their contacts. Rather than asking people to do things, you get them to do something that they want to do alongside what you want to do. And you cannot actually control agendas. What you can do is to connect people once they are mobilized. You connect them to each other and you connect them to a common purpose.

We have been watching this happen with the political movements in the Middle East, and it is exhilarating—and also unsettling. There are people at the center, exercising some level of power—and it is not random, quite the opposite. The young leaders of these revolutions are “anti-leaders,” in the sense that none of them wants to be identified or take credit as leaders. But they have all learned how to mobilize others from successful revolutionaries in other countries. They have learned precisely how to mobilize people and connect them to a common purpose, often through Facebook. And then they have learned a variety of techniques to transform Facebook protests into street action. They use all sorts of techniques to create commitment to a common mission and to make that mission cool, to make it something people want to do enough to take risks for it, even to face down bullets.

Interestingly enough, however, leaders of horizontal movements cannot structure their followers’ preferences in the same way that a top-down leader can. The commitment to a common mission creates generally aligned preferences. But to lead, you have to be willing to change your own mind—within reason. If I am going to persuade you of something, you will not listen to me unless you
believe I am listening to you. If we are going to have a dialogue—as opposed to I am going to talk at you and you are going to talk at me—then you have to sense that I am listening. If you sense that I am willing to be persuaded, you will be much more willing to be persuaded yourself. Leadership in this context often requires a willingness to change your own mind, to alter your own preferences within the broad parameters of the common mission.

This is a very different form of power than command or controlling agendas or shaping preferences. Both exist. I do not think there is any structure in the world that does not have some hierarchy and some web. For example, consider Wikipedia which everybody thinks is the ultimate example of a webbed horizontal organization. Not quite; it has fifty-odd people who work for it, under a boss, rules and hierarchy. Consider the U.S. military, traditionally a very hierarchical organization. But to understand what the service men and women at the bottom are seeing and thinking, they must be empowered to tell their superiors directly and openly, which means you have to create web structures amid hierarchical structures—and that is no easy task.

In contrast, leadership in the Lego world follows a “connect and orchestrate” model. Google, which of course is hierarchal, is also horizontal. It brings in a lot of really talented people. It tells them to work on projects but it does not tell them what to do in any way. It encourages play. It encourages countless different connections. It encourages them to spend one day a week doing what they want to do. In the Lego world, leadership manages talent and leads by connecting and orchestrating the resulting networks, and using what they produce in a broad general direction.

IV. DIPLOMACY IN THE NETWORKED WORLD

I want to conclude by talking about several specific examples of how the U.S. State Department is doing diplomacy in the networked world. It continues to operate in terms of traditional diplomacy, but I am proud to say that it has become a source of real innovation—not only in government work but in how we think about foreign policy, and how we engage other governments. Indeed,
many other governments are looking to the U.S. State Department to follow its lead with respect to these innovations.

There has been much in the press about the Obama Administration’s pivot to Asia, but the State Department has been working on a “pivot to the people”: figuring out how to engage other society’s people in addition to their governments. For example, Secretary Clinton has appointed ambassadors for outreach to youth, to women, to entrepreneurs, to religious communities, and to diasporas. The special adviser for youth affairs is creating youth councils at all of our embassies to work with local youth on creating programming that will attract youth. I follow U.S. Embassy Cairo on Twitter, and they recently tweeted out a version of American Idol for a singing contest particularly for Egyptian women. This is not your father’s embassy. This is a very different approach but one much more likely to reach youth, and other communities not traditionally part of the diplomatic discourse.

Second, the State Department has developed a number of public-private partnerships. In addition to the cookstoves coalition referenced above, there are countless others. A recent noteworthy one involved the United States sending to Japan a shipment of 3,000 dogwood trees to commemorate U.S.-Japanese relations. The trees will be planted in many places where the earthquake and the tsunami hit. They are in exchange for the cherry trees that Japan sent to us, which will be soon blooming around the Tidal Basin. The project was funded entirely with private funds. It was orchestrated by the Assistant Secretary for East Asia and the Pacific, but he brought together corporations and others to pay for it and to execute it.

Third, the State Department is wading into the area of techno-diplomacy. It is not a very elegant word, and I would love to come up with a better one, but the idea is to connect technologists to the goals of U.S. diplomacy and development through networking events. To this end, the State Department has run over thirty tech camps for NGOs around the world, the most recent one was held in Peru in 2012. The United States sends experts from the technology

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industry to teach people how they can use technology to advance their agendas. Often, the attendees establish spinoff tech camps where they share their knowledge with others. In addition, the State Department has hosted tech camps in Washington, bringing together people from the technology industry, with people with certain sets of problems like health and development or education to figure out what are the best technological solutions.

Fourth, the State Department is reengaging with state and local governments in the United States. Too often, the State Department has ignored how valuable our state and local governments are in terms of building networks around the world. The Sister Cities International24 program generates a tremendous number of contacts. The C40 Cities,25 initiated by former President Clinton and New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg, brings together the top forty carbon emitting cities in the work to fight climate change, to exchange best practice, and to collaborate in all sorts of programs.

Fifth, the State Department engages in information diplomacy, an effort to target the people of the foreign state. The best example of this kind of activity may be when the U.S. Embassy in Beijing tweeted out the actual air quality index every day, which proved to be rather different from the Chinese government’s air quality index.26 “This type of information diplomacy was of real value to the residents of Beijing, so much so that the Chinese government was not happy with us for providing this service.”27 In a similar vein, the U.S. Embassy in Pretoria sends out articles about African politics all over Africa and particularly about things happening in South Africa. This is not traditional public diplomacy. We are not telling countries how great we are. Instead, we are broadcasting how great

they are and we are providing good, accurate information from multiple sources in their region. I think it is a great thing for the United States to be known for and it is coming very fast.

The following projects should be added to the list of State Department efforts to practice diplomacy in a networked world. Secretary Clinton has created a new Undersecretary for Civilian Security, Democracy and Human Rights, who oversees five bureaus that are responsible for the basic security and wellbeing of human beings around the world. A new Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations focuses on the prevention of violence within societies and the reconstruction of conflict-torn societies; the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs focuses on stopping the violence from trafficking in drugs, arms, money, and people. Other bureaus meet the basic human needs of refugees and displaced people and protect the rights of all citizens through democracy and the rule of law. Other projects include the internet freedom initiatives; and the Open Government Partnership (OGP). The OGP has not gotten nearly enough attention. The United States launched it with Brazil at the U.N. General Assembly last year. It invites all governments to join who want to commit themselves to transparency, accountability, and citizen participation. It sounds a lot like democracy building but it avoids the controversy of framing it as democracy promotion. Most important, governments have to make express commitments as to how they will increase the

31 For a detailed look at the U.S. Department of State’s position on internet freedom, see Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State, U.S. Department of State, Remarks on Internet Freedom (Jan. 21, 2010) (transcript and video available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/01/135519.htm).
transparency, accountability and citizen participation that allow societies actually to engage their governments.

That is the big picture. If you return to the crises I showed at the outset—with Iran, with Syria, in the South China Sea, with Egypt—plenty of traditional geopolitical issues remain on the public agenda. Equally noticeable, however, are the pressing issues that come from the networked world, from the social actors in those states and the issues that affect their everyday lives. Those issues can give rise to global pandemics, climate change, and political movements. Going forward, the United States must craft a foreign policy that works in both the billiard ball world and the Lego world. This approach will require us to mobilize all of the assets in our society, and will enable all of us to play a much greater role in responding to the challenges presented by an increasingly complex and ever-changing world.