First Paragraph
I would like first to distinguish carefully between interlocutors I call "reasonable"-whether or not they defend the right of girls in high school to wear the veil-and advocates of views I consider "unreasonable." Of course, the very notion of reasonableness depends on certain basic shared values. In the present case, these values are liberal-democratic, that is, human rights and popular sovereignty. If one chooses to defend a given position from inside the realm of these values, one must necessarily begin the process of argumentation by proposing some premises that will be generally accepted by the relevant audience, that is, individuals who, from a moral point of view, value the principles of liberal democracy and whatever consequences they might entail.
Recommended Citation
Guy Haarscher, Secularism, the Veil and "Reasonable Interlocutors": Why France Is Not That Wrong, 28 Penn St. Int'l L. Rev. 367 (2010).
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