Document Type
Article
Publication Date
1991
Abstract
This article responds to Paul Bergman and Al Moore's doubt that ideal triers of facts would be Bayesians. They argue that Bayes' rule, and probability theory in general, fails as a theoretical factfinding model. While probability has long been an accepted measure of belief in empirical propositions and the validity of inductive arguments, this articles addresses Bergman and Moore's doubts directly. It shows how their examples demonstrating the "frequentist" character of Bayesian methodology or the fallacies in Bayesian analysis are easily handled without a frequentist interpretation of probability. Then it shows that an ideal juror's partial beliefs will conform to the calculus of probabilities.
Recommended Citation
David H. Kaye, Credal Probability, 13 Cardozo L. Rev. 647 (1991).
Comments
This article was originally published at 13 Cardozo L. Rev. 647.