The U.S. Supreme Court has long adhered to a federal policy favoring arbitration, and has consistently resolved ambiguities within arbitration clauses in favor of arbitration. In applying thus principle, courts are guided by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) which provides the federal substantive law of arbitrability. The Court has now consistently interpreted the FAA's main purpose as to guarantee that arbitration agreements are enforced according to their terms. Yet, in regards to procedural matters of arbitrability there is a presumption that these matters should be decided by the court, unless otherwise stated in the arbitral agreement. But where parties devise broad reaching arbitration agreements, we have seen the court determine that the arbitrator, not the court, is better equipped to decide arbitrability. Likewise, where a choice-of-law provision introduces ambiguity into the arbitration agreement, the court has determined that the arbitrator, and not the court, shall devide procedural arbitration matters. The court's deference to arbitrators on matters concerning choice-of-law provisions in opposition to arbitration has traditionally been based on ambiguous language found within a given position. This suggests that in circumstances where parties expressly, clearly, and specifically agree to have a particular law govern the arbitration procedure, courts shall enforce the agreement, so long as it does not create ambiguity. Yet, courts have failed to provide guidance as to the level of clarity required to enforce an agreement whose provisions are opposition to arbitration.
Daivy P. Dambreville, Just a Matter of Time: The Second Circuit Renders Ancillary State Laws Inapplicable by Authorizing Arbitrators to Decide Whether a Statute of Limitations Caqn Bar Arbitration, 4 307 (2012).